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NOTHING TO DECLARE BUT THEIR
CHILDHOOD: REFORMING U.S. ASYLUM
LAW TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN
Rachel Bien*
INTRODUCTION
Bernard Lukwago was fifteen years old when rebels with the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) kicked in the door to his family
home and murdered his parents.1 The rebels tied Lukwago’s hands
with a rope and took him to their camp.2 At the camp, armed rebels
held Lukwago captive in a tent with other kidnapped children.3
The rebels told him that if he tried to escape he would be killed.4
Lukwago witnessed the rebels kill two children who had failed in
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Brown University, 2000. The
author would like to dedicate this note to Brooklyn Law School’s Safe Harbor
Clinic, which provides legal assistance to individuals seeking asylum in the
United States. Special thanks to Professor Stacy Caplow for her guidance,
support, and humor. Many thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy
for their patience and encouragement.
1
Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2003). The Lord’s
Resistance Army is an organized rebel group that has waged a brutal war against
the Ugandan government for seventeen years. Press Release, Human Rights
Watch, Uganda: Sharp Decline in Human Rights (July 15, 2003), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/uganda071503.htm.
Both
sides
have
committed gross human rights abuses, including murder, torture, rape,
recruitment of children, and arbitrary detention. Id.
2
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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their attempt to flee.5 The rebels trained Lukwago to shoot a gun
and threatened to kill him if he refused to follow their orders.6
Once trained, the rebels forced Lukwago to fight alongside other
children on the front line against government soldiers.7 The rebels
also forced Lukwago to accompany them on attacks against
civilians.8 During these attacks, Lukwago witnessed the rebels
mutilate civilians by cutting their lips and fingers.9
Lukwago escaped from his captors while collecting firewood
weeks after his capture.10 Carrying a false passport, Lukwago
arrived in the United States at New York’s John F. Kennedy
airport in November 2000.11 He immediately applied for asylum,
based on his past persecution by the LRA.12 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) detained Lukwago in prison for
twenty-one months while his asylum claim wound its way through
the system.13 In August 2001, an immigration judge rejected
5

Id.
Id.
7
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 164.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165. Under U.S. asylum law, persecution must be
on account of one of five specified grounds: political opinion, religion, race,
nationality, or membership in a particular social group. Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2003). See infra
Part I (discussing the grounds for obtaining asylum in the United States).
Lukwago argued that he qualified as a refugee because he was persecuted on
account of his membership in the particular social group of children from
Northern Uganda who were abducted and enslaved by the LRA and oppose their
involuntary servitude. Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 167.
13
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was reorganized in
2003 following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) assumed the INS’s
immigration service functions while its immigration enforcement functions were
assumed by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See
DHS website, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home4.jsp (last visited
Mar. 7, 2004). The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), which
remains under the authority of the Department of Justice, is responsible for
immigration court proceedings before immigration judges as well as the Board
6
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Lukwago’s claim based on his finding that Lukwago’s testimony
was not credible.14 Specifically, the immigration judge found
Lukwago not credible due to his demeanor in the courtroom, citing
his lack of eye contact.15 The IJ also found suspicious Lukwago’s
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See EOIR website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/background.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). This note will continue to refer
to the USCIS as the INS. The INS transferred Lukwago from prison to prison a
half a dozen times, usually without warning or explanation. Melissa Dribben,
Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 4, 2002, (Magazine),
available at http://www.law.vill.edu/currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/
childsoldier.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). In March 2002, following the
immigration judge’s denial of asylum, INS officers took Lukwago from his cell
in the York County Prison, drove him to New York’s John F. Kennedy airport,
and put him on a flight to Madrid. Id. The authorities in Madrid, however,
refused to accept Lukwago and put him on a return flight to New York. Id. He
was then returned to the same jail cell in Pennsylvania, all within twenty-four
hours. Id.
14
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 165. Because an applicant’s credible testimony is
sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof without other corroborating evidence,
the applicant’s credibility is a crucial factor in the immigration judge’s
determination of whether the applicant has successfully made a claim for
asylum. Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in
Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (1991) (explaining that the chaotic conditions that give rise to an applicant’s
flight from her country of origin often make it impossible for her to obtain
corroborating evidence, and thus immigration judges frequently must evaluate
asylum claims based solely on the applicant’s written and oral testimony). See
infra Part I.A. (discussing an applicant’s burden of proof under U.S. asylum
law). The immigration judge deciding Lukwago’s case acknowledged that while
“close observation of a witness testifying under oath is a useful tool in assessing
credibility . . . [it is] fraught with peril since the interpreter may misinterpret a
witness’ mannerisms . . . which may or may not have any bearing on
truthfulness.” Melissa Dribben, Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 4, 2002 (Magazine), available at http://www.law.vill.edu/
currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/childsoldier.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2004).
15
Melissa Dribben, Freeing a Former Child Soldier, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Aug. 4, 2002 (Magazine) (citing the immigration judge’s decision, which
emphasized the fact that “during [Lukwago’s] entire testimony . . . there was
very little eye contact with the person asking the questions”), available at
http://www.law.vill.edu/currentstudents/clinicsandexternships/docs/childsoldier.
pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). According to Dr. Susan Dicklich, an expert
witness who appeared at Lukwago’s asylum hearing, however, “[i]n Ugandan
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response when asked how he felt upon witnessing his parents’
murders; he said he had felt “nervous.”16
Lukwago’s lawyers appealed his case to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which rejected the immigration
judge’s reasons for questioning Lukwago’s credibility.17
Nonetheless, the BIA denied Lukwago’s request for asylum.18
Although the BIA acknowledged that the evidence established that
the LRA “does harm children,” it did not “demonstrate that
[Lukwago] was targeted by the LRA because he was a child.”19
Thus, the BIA found that Lukwago had not shown that his
mistreatment was on account of his membership in a particular
social group, namely, children in Uganda.20 Indeed, the BIA
culture, it is incredibly rude to look a person of authority directly in the eye.” Id.
Lukwago’s reluctance to look the judge in the eye indicated his respect for the
court. Id.
16
Tina Moore, Former Child Soldier Seeks Asylum from a More Defensive
INS, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sept. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.westlaw.com.
17
Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 165. The BIA is the highest administrative body
for interpreting and applying U.S. immigration laws, with nationwide
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions rendered by immigration judges.
EOIR website, at http://usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
BIA decisions are binding on all immigration judges and Department of
Homeland Security officers, unless modified or overruled by the Attorney
General or a federal court. Id.
18
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 166.
19
Id.
20
Lukwago, 329 F.3d. at 166-68 (noting that Lukwago’s graphic testimony
clearly established that the LRA’s treatment of him amounted to persecution).
See infra Part I.A (discussing the definition of “persecution” under U.S. asylum
case law). The INS argued that Lukwago’s forced military conscription did not
constitute persecution. Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 168-69 (citing M.A. v. U.S. I.N.S.,
899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990)) (holding that “a sovereign nation enjoys the
right to enforce its laws of conscription, and that penalties for evasion are not
considered persecution”). The Third Circuit distinguished government
conscription from conscription by guerilla forces, finding that Lukwago did not
violate a legitimate conscription requirement under Ugandan law, but was
forcibly abducted by a guerilla organization that was mounting attacks against
the established government. Id. at 169. Thus, the Third Circuit found that
Lukwago’s forced conscription, coupled with the physical and psychological
abuse he endured, constituted persecution. Id. at 170. The Third Circuit,
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questioned whether a group based on age could qualify as a
particular social group.21 As this case makes clear, U.S. asylum
law reserves no special protection for children in Lukwago’s
position. The law treats his misfortune the same as that of any
adult civilian caught up in the throws of war.
With hundreds, if not thousands, of children seeking asylum in
the United States each year, this and many other cases involving
children raise hard questions about whether the United States
asylum system adequately recognizes and accounts for the special
difficulties of child asylum-seekers.22 These questions include
however, agreed with the BIA that Lukwago had been unable to demonstrate
that his past persecution was on account of his status as a child. Id. at 173. The
Third Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to reconsider Lukwago’s claim that
he feared future persecution by the LRA due to his membership in the particular
social group consisting of escaped LRA child soldiers. Id. at 183. On August 25,
2003, the BIA granted Lukwago asylum based on the fact that while fighting his
deportation, he spoke out publicly about his experience as a captured child
soldier. David Caruso, Ex-Child Soldier, 21, Is Granted Asylum, Sept. 3, 2003,
PHILA. INQUIRER, at B2. This publicity increased the likelihood that Lukwago
would be a target of retaliation if he were forced to return to Uganda. Id.
Although Lukwago was ultimately granted asylum, his case demonstrates the
enormous hardships that children in the U.S. asylum system confront, including
prolonged detention and limited access to legal counsel, which are compounded
by the absence of psychological and social welfare services geared to children.
See infra Part II.A & B (describing the treatment of child asylum-seekers in the
United States and the need to increase procedural protections for children in the
system).
21
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 171.
22
Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature:
Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 84, 85 (1999). Throughout this note, the term “child” refers to an
individual who is under the age of eighteen. The age of eighteen often serves as
the dividing line separating childhood and adulthood for two primary reasons.
First, the age of eighteen is widely recognized internationally as the age of legal
majority. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Children:
Guidelines on Protection and Care, 1994, at 8. Second, most individuals under
the age of eighteen have not “fully developed the emotional maturity and
judgment, nor achieved the social status, of adults that come with life
experience.” Id. Thus, in refugee situations, individuals under the age of
eighteen require “special care and assistance” because they are still “developing
their identities and learning essential skills” in the absence of the sense of
security that normally characterizes childhood. Id. The United States currently
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whether there are additional factors asylum adjudicators should
consider when deciding whether to grant asylum to children;
whether the asylum system should afford children special
procedural protections; whether a different legal standard should
apply to children’s asylum claims or whether one standard should
apply equally to adult and child claimants; and whether the United
States owes a responsibility to children beyond that which it may
owe adults.
This note attempts to highlight some of the deficiencies of
current asylum practice as it pertains to children, describe how
U.S. asylum policy may be moving towards greater recognition of
the enormous procedural hardships faced by children in the U.S.
asylum system, and propose some concrete solutions. Part I
describes the historical foundations of U.S. asylum law, the
substance of the law itself, and its application in practice. Part II
highlights the international measures that have been taken to
recognize the special status of child refugees. Part III examines the
ways in which U.S. asylum policy currently responds to child
refugees, including recent legislative proposals to afford children
in the asylum system greater procedural protections, and suggests
ways in which certain procedural protections should be expanded.
Finally, Part IV discusses the failure of current U.S. asylum law to
account properly for the forms of persecution unique to children
and suggests ways to increase substantive protections for children.
I.

THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. ASYLUM POLICY

The enormous need for humanitarian action to assist the
millions of people displaced by the Second World War spurred the
international community to craft new standards for the protection
of refugees.23 These humanitarian principles, embodied in the 1951
does not track the number of children who apply for asylum in this country.
Proposed legislation would, however, require the President to provide statistics
on unaccompanied refugee children in an annual report to Congress.
Unaccompanied Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th Cong. § 402(a)
(2003). See infra Part III.A (discussing the important procedural protections
afforded by the proposed bill).
23
Michael J. Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in Immigration Law, 12 GEO.
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United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Convention) and in its 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol),
impose on countries the obligation to protect any individual,
outside her country of origin, found to have a “well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”24
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act),
the United States, for the first time, provided a comprehensive and
continuing statutory framework for the admission of refugees into
this country, and brought the United States into conformity with its
obligations under the Refugee Convention.25 The Refugee Act
IMMIGR. L.J. 443, 444 (1998) (describing how the first international refugee
initiatives sought to address the plight of the nearly eight million people
displaced as a direct result of World War II, of which one million either could
not return or were unwilling to return to their homes). The United States lacked
any statutory mechanism to admit individuals fleeing persecution during World
War II and, thus, tragically failed to protect Jewish refugees attempting to
escape Nazi persecution. KAREN MUSALO, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 64
(1997). In 1939, the United States refused to grant nine hundred German Jews
safe haven, forcing their ship, the St. Louis, to return to Europe. Id. As a result,
most of the nine hundred Jewish refugees were subsequently killed by the Nazis.
Id.
24
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art.
1(A)(2), 189 U.N.T.S 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]; Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967
Protocol, thereby accepting the 1951 Convention. 1967 Protocol, supra, at 6257.
The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol obligate state parties to cooperate with
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose primary
responsibility is to supervise states’ compliance with the provisions of the
Convention. 1951 Convention, preamble, art. 35 (1); 1967 Protocol, art. II (1).
25
The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). See S.
Rep. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); H.R. Rep. No. 96-608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (noting that the Refugee Act would “bring the United
States into conformity with our international obligations under the [1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol]”). Prior to enactment of the Refugee Act, U.S.
refugee law provided the Attorney General with discretion to withhold the
deportation of any individual within the United States who would be subjected
to persecution on account of political opinion, race, or religion. MUSALO, supra
note 23, at 67. Outside the territory of the United States, only those individuals
fleeing from communism or countries in the Middle East were eligible for
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incorporated the definition of “refugee,” as codified by the
Refugee Convention, into the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), the basic body of U.S. immigration law.26 Like the Refugee
Convention, humanitarian principles are central to U.S. refugee
policy under the Refugee Act.27 The Refugee Act authorizes the
United States Attorney General to admit refugees from places
outside as well as inside the United States who meet the statutory
definition of a refugee.28
A. Proving Asylum Eligibility under U.S. Law
In order to make a claim for asylum under the INA, an
applicant has the burden of establishing that she meets the
definition of a refugee.29 The INA defines a refugee as a person
outside her country of nationality, who is “unable or unwilling to
[return to] that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”30 In
refugee status in the United States. Id.
26
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2003); 1951 Convention, supra note 24.
27
U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform 1997 Report to Congress:
Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy 69-70, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/reports.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). The U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform, a bi-partisan research commission
mandated by the Immigration Act of 1990 to examine and make
recommendations regarding the implementation and impact of U.S. immigration
policy, stated that asylum and “[r]efugee admissions are based on human rights
and humanitarian considerations, as one of the several elements of U.S.
leadership in assisting the world’s persecuted.” Id.
28
Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(c)(1) (2004). The Attorney
General is responsible for promulgating regulations for asylum adjudication,
which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) under Title 8.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(g)(2) (2004).
29
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (stating that the burden on the applicant is lower than
the preponderance of the evidence standand and that, therefore, the applicant
need not show that the situation in her country of origin would probably result in
persecution, so long as she shows that persecution is a reasonable possibility).
30
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A) (2004).
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order to establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must provide
subjective evidence that she actually fears return, as well as
objective evidence that there is a reasonable basis for her fear.31 An
applicant may satisfy her burden of demonstrating her subjective
fear by expressing her opinions, feelings, and experiences.32 An
applicant may satisfy the objective requirement through
documentary evidence, if such evidence is available, or through
her own persuasive and credible testimony.33
While the INA does not define persecution, U.S. courts have
interpreted the term to involve “the infliction of suffering or harm
upon those who differ . . . in a way that is regarded as offensive.”34
Although persecution “does not require bodily harm or a threat to
life or liberty,” it is a strong concept involving more than
discrimination or harassment.35 The persecutor need not be the
31

In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987) (finding that an
applicant has established the objective component of a well-founded fear if she
shows that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution); In
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221 (B.I.A. 1986) (defining the subjective
component of a well-founded fear as a genuine apprehension or awareness of
danger).
32
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (noting that the
reference to “fear” in the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of a
refugee requires an examination of the applicant’s subjective mental state);
Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
an applicant’s credible testimony that she genuinely fears persecution will
satisfy her burden of proving a subjective fear).
33
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2004) (stating that an applicant’s credible
testimony may be sufficient to meet the burden of proof without other
corroborating evidence); Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that the applicant can satisfy the objective requirement
through either “the production of specific documentary evidence or by credible
and persuasive testimony”).
34
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Iranian
government’s enforcement of its strict dress and conduct rules did not rise to the
level of persecution). See also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th
Cir. 1985) (defining persecution as “oppression which is inflicted on groups or
individuals because of a difference that the persecutor will not tolerate”).
35
Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding evidence that
the applicant’s neighbors threw rocks at her house and stole and damaged her
property due to her Indo-Fijian ethnicity insufficient to constitute persecution);
Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961.
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government as long as the government is unable or unwilling to
control the persecuting individual or organization.36
A well-founded fear of persecution may be demonstrated by
establishing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution.37 Demonstration of past persecution creates a
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution.38 Where the INS has successfully rebutted an
applicant’s past persecution claim, the applicant bears the burden
of raising alternative facts to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
future persecution.39
B. Recent Developments in U.S. Asylum Law
In 1990, the INS created a new corps of asylum adjudicators
specially trained in evaluating human rights conditions in foreign

36

Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the
actions of a terrorist group that the government is unable to control are not
private acts outside the scope of the refugee definition); In re Kasinga, 1996
B.I.A. LEXIS 15, 25 (1996) (finding that the government’s toleration of the
practice of female genital mutilation indicates that it is unwilling to control the
applicant’s persecutors).
37
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004).
38
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). The INS may rebut the presumption by
establishing a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
Any change in circumstance, not exclusively those related to country conditions,
may be considered to contradict the applicant’s asylum claim, “so long as those
changes are fundamental in nature and go to the basis of the fear of
persecution.” Federal Register, 65 Fed. Reg. 76121, 76127 (Dec. 6, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). In addition, an applicant who has established prima
facie persecution may nonetheless be denied asylum if the INS can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could have reasonably been
expected to avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of his or her
country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).
39
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2004). Upon a showing of past persecution,
where the record demonstrates changed country conditions sufficient to
overcome the well-founded fear presumption, the applicant bears the burden of
demonstrating that she has a well-founded fear of persecution from any new
sources. In re N-M-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 15 (B.I.A. 1998).
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countries.40 These asylum officers review the asylum applications
of claimants who apply “affirmatively.”41 Asylum officers may
either grant an applicant asylum, or alternatively, refer the
application to the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR), commonly known as “immigration court,” for review by
an immigration judge.42 Applicants who apply affirmatively are
not placed in detention during proceedings.43
An applicant must make a defensive asylum claim when the
INS initiates removal proceedings against her.44 Defensive claims
are not heard by the asylum corps, but are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the EOIR.45 Applicants who make defensive claims
may be detained pending the immigration judge’s determination of
their eligibility for asylum.46
40

8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (b) (2004). See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), History of the United States Asylum Corps, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm#E (last visited Dec. 2,
2003). The asylum corps works under the USCIS within the Department of
Homeland Security. Id.
41
8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (a) (2004). Claimants, who apply affirmatively,
voluntarily present themselves to the INS. Id. See also USCIS, Obtaining
Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
42
USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
43
Id. These applicants often turn to family or friends, churches, mosques,
and other charitable or community-based organizations for support and
accommodation while they await the adjudication of their asylum claims. See
CHRISTOPHER J. EINOLF, THE MERCY FACTORY 213-14 (2001).
44
8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2004). See EOIR website, at http://www.
usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
45
8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2004). See EOIR website, at http://www.
usdoj.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
46
8 C.F.R. § 236(a) (2004). The applicant may be released on a bond of at
least $1500 on certain conditions determined by the INS District Director. 8
C.F.R. § 236(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B). There is no judicial review available to
applicants who have been denied release. 8 C.F.R. § 236(e). There is disturbing
evidence that the INS continues to detain many individuals who have been
granted asylum while it pursues appeals of their decisions. HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, IN LIBERTY’S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE
ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 31 (2004).
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In addition, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility
Act of 1996 mandated that the INS detain, and place in expedited
removal proceedings, asylum applicants identified at U.S. ports of
entry.47 Those who indicate a fear of persecution during the
expedited removal process receive a “credible fear” interview with
an asylum officer.48 At the interview, the applicant must establish
that that there is a “significant possibility” that she could establish
eligibility for asylum.49 If the asylum officer determines that the
applicant has a credible fear of returning to her country of
nationality, she refers the claim for ordinary removal proceedings
before an immigration judge, at which time the applicant may raise
her asylum claim.50
II. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS
OF REFUGEE CHILDREN
Almost half of the twenty-one million refugees in the world are
children under the age of eighteen.51 As many as 20,000 children,
47

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No.104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009, 3581 [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. See
USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/paths.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
48
IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 302; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2004).
49
IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 302.
50
Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2004). If the asylum officer determines that the
applicant has not established a credible fear of persecution, the asylum officer
must inform the applicant in writing and inquire whether the applicant wishes to
appeal the decision to an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(1), (g)(2)(i)
(2004). If the immigration judge concurs with the asylum officer’s negative
decision, the case is referred to the INS for deportation. 8 C.F.R. §
208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2004). The applicant cannot appeal the immigration
judge’s decision. Id.
51
Press release, UNHCR, Half of the Refugees in the World Are Children
Under 18 Years (May 11, 2002), at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=3cdf7d6428 (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). The
United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 to lead and coordinate
international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems around the
world. UNHCR website, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
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unaccompanied by parents or legal guardians, apply for asylum
each year in North America, Europe, and Australia.52 Children flee
from some of the most atrocious abuses, including forced military
conscription, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, child
labor, sexual servitude, and domestic violence.53 According to the
U.N.’s 1996 Machel Report, a study documenting the effects of
armed conflict on children, children are not merely innocent
bystanders to war, but have become targets of genocide, forced
military recruitment, sexual violence, torture, and exploitation.54
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
52

UNHCR, The World of Children at a Glance, at http://www.unhcr.ch/
children/glance.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). UNHCR defines an
unaccompanied child as a “person who is under the age of eighteen years . . .
and who is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult
who by law or custom has responsibility to do so.” UNHCR, Guidelines on
Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking
Asylum, Feb. 1997 [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]. In many cases, children
arrive unaccompanied because their parents have been killed, imprisoned, or
have taken ill in their country of origin. WENDY AYOTTE & LOUISE
WILLIAMSON, SEPARATED CHILDREN IN THE U.K.: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
CURRENT SITUATION 16 (2001), available at http://www.asylum
support.info/publications/refugeecouncil/seperated.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2004) (discussing why children arrive without parents or guardians). In other
cases, it is the child herself who is at risk and it is her parents’ decision to send
her to another country for safety. Id. Most parents in developing countries do not
have the resources to pay for their own travel costs in addition to their child’s.
Id.
53
Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature:
Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines,11 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 84, 86 (1999).
54
Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General on the Impact of Armed
Conflict on Children, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc.
A/51/306 (1996) [hereinafter Machel Report]. The U.N. Committee on the
Rights of the Child recommended that the Secretary General appoint Graca
Machel, the former Minister of Education of Mozambique, as an independent
expert to study the impact of armed conflict on children. Alison Dundes Renteln,
The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing International Standards, 21
WHITTIER L. REV. 191, 201 (1999). She presented her comprehensive study to
the U.N. General Assembly in August 1996. Id. Consequently, the General
Assembly recommended the appointment of a permanent Special Representative
on the impact of armed conflict on children. Id.
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represented the first international treaty to explicitly provide
special protections for children’s rights.55 While international
refugee law previously viewed a child’s asylum claim as derivative
of his or her parent’s claim, the CRC obligates states to ensure that
each child seeking refugee status, whether accompanied or
unaccompanied by his or her parents, receives protection and
humanitarian assistance.56 Moreover, the “best interests of the
child” must be a primary consideration of states in all actions
concerning children, including those undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies.57 The CRC applies to every
55

Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448
[hereinafter CRC].
56
Id., art. 22(1). See also Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 87 (noting
that accompanied children have tended to be subsumed within their family’s
asylum application, and, thus, immigration and child welfare authorities have
devoted little attention to refugee children as a distinct group). This note will
refer to countries or nations as states.
57
CRC, supra note 55, at art. 3(1). The drafting history of the CRC
includes no specific definition of the “best interests of the child” standard. THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11
(PHILIP ALSTON, ED. 1994). However, the extensive usage of the standard in the
domestic law of many states may have led the drafters to reasonably believe that
states were already sufficiently familiar with the phrase and its application. Id. at
11. The particular language adopted sheds some light on the intention of the
drafters with respect to the application of the best interest standard. Id. at 13. For
instance, the requirement that the child’s best interests be “a primary
consideration” appears to “impose a burden of proof on those seeking to apply a
non-child-centered” approach to demonstrate that the other interests at stake are
equally, if not more, compelling. Id. The term “consideration” suggests a
process that is genuinely deliberative, as opposed to merely formal. Id. Finally,
although the CRC does not provide any definitive statement of how an
individual child’s best interests would be served in a given situation, the rights
enumerated in the treaty serve as “signposts” to guide adjudicators and
policymakers seeking to identify a child’s best interests. Id. at 19. The American
Bar Association’s Standards of Practice for Lawyer’s Representing a Child in
Abuse and Neglect Cases state that where a lawyer is appointed to represent the
“best interests” of the child, that determination “should be based on objective
criteria addressing the child’s specific needs and preferences, the goal of
expeditious resolution of the case . . . and the use of the least
restrictive/detrimental alternatives available.” American Bar Association,

BIENMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 1:15 PM

CHILD ASYLUM SEEKERS

811

child within a state’s jurisdiction and prohibits discrimination
irrespective of the child’s or her parent’s birth or any other status.58
Over 190 countries have ratified the CRC, making it the most
ratified human rights treaty in history.59 Although the U.S. has not
ratified the treaty, it is a signatory, and thus is obliged under
international treaty law to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the Convention.60 The INS has
Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing a Child in Abuse and Neglect
Cases (1996), available at http://www.abanet.org/child/ childrep.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004).
58
CRC, supra note 55, at art. 2(1).
59
See UNHCR at http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited Feb. 4, 2004)
(providing the complete list of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of
Children).
60
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18(a),
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The act of signing a treaty generally expresses a state’s
consent to be bound to the treaty, even though the further step of ratification is
required for the treaty to enter into force with respect to that state. ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 75 (2000). Thus, in the period prior
to ratification, the signatory state is under an obligation to refrain from doing
anything that would “affect its ability fully to comply with the treaty once it has
entered into force” or “invalidate the basic purpose of the treaty.” Id. at 94. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND DEPRIVED OF RIGHTS: CHILDREN IN
INS CUSTODY, n.40, available at http://www.hrw.org/ reports98/ins2/berks98d01.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (documenting the INS’s practice of detaining
refugee children in centers for juvenile offenders, where they are subjected to
strip-searches and other degrading treatment, in violation of the rights protected
under the CRC). Other than the United States, Somalia is the only other U.N.member state not to have ratified the CRC. Id. Prior to ratifying any treaty, the
United States undertakes an extensive evaluation of its domestic laws and
practices at both the federal and state level to determine how to bring them into
compliance with the treaty. See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). This evaluation
can take several years, particularly in cases in which certain provisions of the
treaty are viewed as controversial. Id. According to the United States Fund for
UNICEF, one of 37 national committees set up to support the work of UNICEF,
two factors have held up U.S. ratification of the CRC: “widespread
misconceptions about the [CRC’s] intent, provisions, and potential impact; and
political opposition.” United States Fund for UNICEF, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://capwiz.com/ unicefusa/issues/alert/?alertid=32697 (last
visited Apr. 8, 2004). Opponents of the CRC argue that it intrudes upon the
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acknowledged that the CRC serves as a significant source of
guidance in developing U.S. policies for child asylum seekers.61
In 1997, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees proposed a
set of children’s asylum guidelines based on the CRC’s
international norms for the protection of children’s rights.62 The
UNHCR Guidelines, like the CRC, underscore the importance of
delivering effective protection and assistance to children in a
systematic, comprehensive, and integrated way.63 Although such a
comprehensive approach would require close collaboration among
a wide variety of government bodies, specialized agencies, and
non-governmental groups, such collaboration would be possible
because the “best interests” principle would provide clear guidance
parent-child relationship by, for example, recognizing a child’s right to sue her
parents and obtain an abortion. Id. In response, CRC supporters point to
language in the CRC that repeatedly emphasizes the primacy and importance of
the family in decisions concerning children. Id. In particular, article 5 obligates
parties to the CRC “to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.” CRC, supra note
55, at art.5. Supporters also point out that the CRC does not explicitly require
states to afford children the right to sue their parents, although there must be
some mechanism in place to allow children to vindicate their rights, or obtain an
abortion. United States Fund for UNICEF, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://capwiz.com/unicefusa/ issues/alert/?alertid=32697 (last visited Apr. 8,
2004). Due to these controversies, evaluation of the CRC has not been a priority
of the U.S. Senate. Id.
61
See infra Part III.A (discussing how the CRC, UNHCR guidelines, and
other international human rights instruments provide important guidance to U.S.
asylum policymakers).
62
UNHCR guidelines, supra note 52. In enacting the Refugee Act,
Congress rewrote U.S. immigration law to bring the United States in line with
its international obligations under the Refugee Convention. MUSALO, supra note
24, at 57. Thus, because U.S. law is based on international law, UNHCR
interpretations of international refugee law, while not binding on the U.S., are
important tools for guiding U.S. refugee law. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 438-49 (1987) (citing the U.N. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status as a source in interpreting U.S. asylum and
refugee law).
63
UNHCR guidelines, supra note 52, § 1.4 (interpreting Article 22(1) of
the CRC as requiring states to take a comprehensive and systematic approach to
the protection of unaccompanied children).
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to policymakers in all actions pertaining to children.64 For
example, the UNHCR Guidelines suggest that states appoint each
child a legal representative, as well as a guardian or advisor with
child welfare expertise, to ensure that the child’s interests are
safeguarded and her needs appropriately met.65 The UNHCR
Guidelines further urge states to not detain child applicants in
prison-like conditions, establish an expedited procedure to process
their claims, and take into account each child’s stage of
development and particular vulnerabilities when assessing her
claim.66 Perhaps most significantly, the UNHCR Guidelines call
attention to the types of human rights abuses that may constitute
persecution under the Refugee Convention for children, but not for
adults.67
Before the UNHCR issued its guidelines, Canada and the
United Kingdom, which also account for a high percentage of all
asylum claims lodged in industrialized countries, had taken steps to
ensure that their domestic asylum laws reflected their international
commitments to meet the needs of child asylum seekers.68 In 1996,
64

Id., § 1.5 (stating that policymakers should rely on the “best interests”
principle to guide them in developing asylum policies for children).
65
Id. §§ 4.2 & 5.7 (recommending that states provide children with a legal
representative and establish an independent and formally accredited organization
that will appoint each child a guardian or advisor).
66
Id. § 7.6 (urging states not to detain children); § 7.7 (stating that
detention should only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time); §§ 8.1 & 8.5 (urging states to develop expedient
proceedings for children that take into account their special needs and
vulnerabilities); § 8.4 (suggesting that asylum adjudicators undergo training to
familiarize them with the special situation of unaccompanied children); § 8.6
(suggesting that asylum adjudicators pay particular regard to a child’s stage of
development and limited knowledge of conditions in her country of origin in
assessing her asylum claim).
67
Id. § 8.7. The guidelines identify the following practices as constituting
persecution under the Refugee Convention: military recruitment of children,
their subjection to forced labor, the trafficking of children for prostitution and
sexual exploitation, and the practice of female genital mutilation. Id. See infra
Part IV.B (arguing for the need to reform U.S. asylum law to account for the
forms of persecution unique to children).
68
Protecting the Rights of Children: The Need for U.S. Children’s Asylum
Guidelines, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
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Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board issued a set of
innovative guidelines concerning child applicants.69 The Canadian
guidelines provide for the appointment of a “designated
representative” to ensure the protection of the child’s “best
interests” throughout the asylum process.70 In addition, they
attempt to ease the burden on unaccompanied children by
establishing a special procedure for their claims and an evidentiary
standard sensitive to each child’s level of maturity and
development.71

December 1998, at 5-8. [hereinafter Women’s Commission Report]. See
UNHCR, Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: Levels and
Trends, 2000-2002, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (stating that, in absolute terms, the United Kingdom
was the largest asylum-seeker receiving country in the industrialized world in
2002, accounting for 19 percent of all asylum applications lodged, followed by
the United States with 14 percent of all claims, and by Canada with 5.7 percent
of all claims).
69
Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and Evidentiary Issues, available
at http://www.cisr.gc.ca/en/about/ guidelines/child_e.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2004) [hereinafter Canadian Guidelines]. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee
Board is the federal agency tasked with adjudicating asylum claims. The
Immigration and Refugee Board: What It Is and How It Works, at
http://www.cisr.gc.ca/en/researchpub/pub/pamphlet/ index_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2004). The Canadian Guidelines preceded the UNHCR guidelines and
are less far-reaching. Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 90.
70
Canadian Guidelines, supra note 69, at A.II (stating that the designated
representative’s duties include retaining counsel for the child, assisting the child
to gather evidence for her claim, and acting as a witness for the child). Before
designating a person to represent the child, the Guidelines require that the
Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Canadian Refugee Board
inform the proposed designated representative of her duties and conduct an
assessment of the person’s ability to fulfill those duties. Id. The Guidelines
require that the designated representative possess “an appreciation of the nature
of the proceedings,” and suggest as factors for consideration the representative’s
“linguistic and cultural background, age, gender, and other personal
characteristics.” Id. In addition, the designated representative must not pose a
conflict of interest situation with the child such that the representative would not
act in the child’s best interests. Id.
71
Id. at Part B.I-II (noting that children are often unable to present
evidence with the same degree of precision as adults and that, therefore, more
weight should be given to the objective elements of the child’s claim).
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The United Kingdom has also taken steps to address the
particular difficulties children face in the system.72 In 1994, the
United Kingdom’s Home Office, the government department
responsible for internal affairs, developed the Refugee Council
Panel of Advisors for Unaccompanied Refugee Children
(Children’s Panel).73 The Children’s Panel was designed to provide
advice, support, and advocacy to child applicants, independent of
the U.K. Immigration and Nationality Department, to ensure that
they receive fair and equal access to legal representation, care, and
accommodation.74 Although the advisors do not represent the
children in asylum proceedings, they provide children with
assistance in finding qualified legal counsel.75 Moreover, the
advisors are responsible for meeting the child’s educational,
housing, health care, and other social welfare needs throughout the
72

Simon Russell, Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the United
Kingdom, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L 126, 135 (1999) (arguing that the Children’s
Panel plays a vital role in the first stages of a child’s asylum determination
process).
73
AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 3, 6-7 (2001) (analyzing the United
Kingdom’s response to unaccompanied children “against a European-wide
framework of good-practice and recommending areas for improvement).
74
U.K. Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Unaccompanied Asylum
Seeking Children Note, § 5.2, available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
75
AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 6-7 (stating that each child is assigned an
advisor who plays a “comprehensive role in supporting the child in relation to
any aspect of [her] situation as an [unaccompanied] child, including immigration
and welfare matters”). Unaccompanied children applying for asylum in the
United Kingdom are afforded aid to pay for their legal assistance. Id. at 23.
Ayotte argues that the Children’s Panel will be unable to meet the needs of the
growing number of unaccompanied children arriving in the United Kingdom
without an increase in its funding and resources. Id. Moreover, due to
inadequate resources, advisors are only able to provide support to the child when
she first arrives in the U.K., and thus do not play a continuing role in ensuring
the child’s interests are protected and her needs met. Id. See also Refugee
Council website, at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/refugeecouncil/what/
what002.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). The Refugee Council is a charitable
organization that receives funding from the U.K. government, the European
Commission, trusts, and its members. Refugee Council website, at
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/refugeecouncil/ therefugeecouncil.htm (last
visited Mar. 21, 2004).
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asylum process.76
III. CHILDREN IN THE U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM
U.S. asylum policy has not traditionally differentiated between
the claims of children and adults.77 With increasing numbers of
child asylum seekers entering the U.S. each year, however, the
U.S. has become far more responsive to international and domestic
pressure to expand the protections afforded to children.78
Every year, thousands of children enter the United States
seeking protection from human rights abuses occurring in their
countries of origin.79 Many of these children enter unaccompanied
by parents or guardians.80 In 2002, U.S. authorities apprehended
more than five thousand unaccompanied children attempting to
enter the country without documentation.81 Many of these children
are victims of highly profitable child smuggling and trafficking
rings.82
76

AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 6-7.
See Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 115.
78
See id. See infra Part III.A (discussing recent positive changes in the
procedural protections afforded to child asylum seekers).
79
See Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 2.
80
Id. The INS defines an unaccompanied minor as a child under the age of
eighteen who seeks admission to the United States and who is not accompanied
by a parent or guardian. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Guidelines
for Children’s Asylum Claims, at 5, n.10 (December 10, 1998) [hereinafter INS
Guidelines],
available
at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/10a_ChldrnGdlns.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2004). See also AYOTTE, supra note 52, at 16 (discussing the reasons
why children arrive unaccompanied).
81
See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, U.S. Senate,
May 22, 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7020 (Statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[F]ivethousand foreign-born children [who lack] parents or legal guardians to protect
them are discovered in the United States each year in need of protection.”).
82
See Ginger Thompson, Littlest Immigrants, Left in Hands of Smugglers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1 (discussing how tightened security following
the September 11th attacks has made it much harder for illegal immigrants to
cross the U.S. border, forcing parents illegally living in the United States to
either allow others to raise their children in their home country or hire smugglers
to sneak their children into the United States).
77
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Prior to 1997, the INS regularly detained children in prisons
alongside juvenile delinquents and adult offenders.83 As part of the
settlement agreement reached in Reno v. Flores, a 1993 federal
class-action suit challenging the INS’s detention of unaccompanied
minors in prison-like conditions, the INS agreed to place detained
children “in the least restrictive setting” in light of the child’s age
and special needs.84 The INS may detain children in juvenile
correction facilities only if the child presents a risk of flight or has
a criminal record.85 Although INS detention practices have
improved in some areas, many argue that the INS has made far too
little progress in seeking out alternatives to detention, such as
release to relatives and foster care.86 Even after the Flores
83

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, available at
THE
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/uscrcks/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2004)
(documenting the INS’s practice of locking up unaccompanied children with
convicted juvenile offenders, and sometimes with adult offenders, forcing them
to wear prison uniforms, and providing them with minimal access to counseling,
legal services, and information about their rights). See also CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FAILED BY FEDERALISM: AD HOC POLICYMAKING TOWARD DETAINED IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE CHILDREN 17 (2001),
available at http://www.centerforhumanrights.org/Detained_minors/Minors
PolicyAnalysis.pdf (last visited December 2, 2003) (documenting violations of
the Flores settlement agreement in INS-contracted detention centers).
84
Processing, Detention, and Release of Juveniles, 63 Fed. Reg. 39759,
39760 (proposed July 24, 1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 236.3) (setting out
interim regulations based on the Flores settlement agreement).
85
Id. at 39,760 (“If a juvenile has committed a crime or a juvenile
delinquent offense, has committed or threatened to commit violent acts, has
engaged in disruptive behavior, is an escape risk, or is in danger, the [INS] may
place him or her in a juvenile detention facility or a[n] [INS] facility having
separate accommodations for juveniles.”). “[I]solated offense[s] . . . not within a
pattern of criminal activity and . . . not involv[ing] violence against a person or
the use or carrying of a weapon” do not constitute offenses permitting detention
in secure facilities. Id. at 39762. Petty offenses, such a shoplifting, joy riding,
and disturbing the peace, are not considered offenses justifying secure detention.
Id.
86
Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 14 (noting that the INS
has made some improvements by opening group shelters in some regions).
AMNESTY INT’L, WHY AM I HERE?: CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
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settlement, nearly one-third of unaccompanied children remain
housed in secure detention facilities designed for juvenile
offenders.87 In response to concern over the INS’s perceived
conflict of interest in serving concurrently as jailor, prosecutor, and
caretaker of unaccompanied children, Congress recently
transferred responsibility for the care and custody of child asylum
seekers from the INS to the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR).88
(2003),
available
at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/children_
detention.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) (arguing that the INS has overused
secure detention for unaccompanied children and failed to place many children
in the “least restricted setting” required by the Flores settlement) [hereinafter
AMNESTY REPORT]. According to the Center for Human Rights and
Constitutional Law, a public interest legal foundation that promotes respect for
the human and constitutional rights of immigrants and refugees, the INS
detained 4736 unaccompanied children from 1999-2000. CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FAILED BY FEDERALISM: AD HOC POLICYMAKING TOWARD DETAINED IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE CHILDREN 10 (2001),
available at http://www.centerforhumanrights.org/Detained_minors/Minors
PolicyAnalysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2004). The average age of all children
detained was approximately 15.26 years. Id. The average number of days spent
in detention was 77.21 days. Id. at 11. Thirty-two percent of children spent time
in secure lock-ups due to insufficient space at non-secure facilities. Id.
87
AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 86, at 1. Only 17 percent of the secure
facilities that responded to Amnesty International’s inquiry reported that
unaccompanied children are separated from juvenile offenders. Id. at 23-24.
Nearly half reported that they house unaccompanied children in the same cell as
juvenile offenders. Id. at 23-24. The majority of unaccompanied children
detained in secure facilities are non-delinquent. Id. at 21. Unaccompanied
children are often categorized as “escape risks” in order to justify housing them
in secure facilities without an individual assessment of whether the risk is
genuine. Id.
88
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 462 (2002). See
The Treatment of Children in INS Custody: Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, available at http://www.womens
commission.org/take_action/testimony.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (citing
the fact that the INS frequently denied release from detention to children who
had been granted asylum because the agency itself had decided to appeal the
decision); Christopher Nugent and Steven Schulman, A New Era in the Legal
Treatment of Alien Children: The Homeland Security and Child Status
Protection Acts, 80 No. 7 INTERPRETER RELEASES 233 (Feb. 19, 2003)
(emphasizing that the transfer in responsibility from the INS, a law enforcement
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A. Changes in the Procedural Protections Afforded to Child
Asylum Seekers
There are positive indications that U.S. refugee policy is
moving toward a greater awareness of the particular procedural
obstacles children face in the asylum system. On December 10,
1998, the INS issued guidelines providing asylum officers with
child-sensitive interview procedures and training.89
The INS Guidelines set forth special procedures to remedy the
particular difficulties that children face in applying for asylum, and
accept the CRC’s “best interests of the child” standard as a “useful
measure” for determining appropriate interview techniques for
child asylum seekers.90 For example, the Guidelines call for
training INS personnel in the unique needs of children asylum
seekers, with the goal of creating a “‘child-friendly’ asylum
interview environment.”91 To this end, the Guidelines suggest
several steps to assist in “building rapport” with children
agency, to the ORR, a human services agency, represents a positive step toward
recognizing unaccompanied children’s welfare and protection needs). See 149
CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (noting that the ORR, a human services
agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, has “decades of
experience working with foreign-born children”).
89
INS Guidelines, supra note 80. The INS Guidelines were issued on
December 10th in honor of International Human Rights Day. Several academic
institutions and non-profit organizations, including the Women’s Commission
for Refugee Women and Children, a non-profit organization that advocates for
refugee women and children around the world, collaborated with the INS to
develop the guidelines, which draw from many of the innovations proposed in
the 1996 Canadian Guidelines as well as the 1997 UNHCR Guidelines. Further
information about the Commission is available at http://www.womens
commission.org.
90
INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 2. The United States has signed, but
not ratified, the CRC. See U.S. Finally Agrees to Sign U.N. Accord for Children,
CHI. TRIBUNE., Feb. 12, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6165212. Nevertheless, the
INS Guidelines affirm that the CRC and other international instruments “need
not be ratified by the U.S. to provide guidance as a source of human rights
norms.” Id. at 2 n.1. See supra Part.II. In referring to the best interests of the
child principle as a “useful measure,” the INS is acknowledging the principle’s
relevance to its policies pertaining to children.
91
INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5.
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applicants.92 For example, interviews begin with a discussion of
“neutral topics,” such as career goals, school, pets, and hobbies, an
explanation of what will happen during the asylum interview, and
reassurance that the child is not expected to be able to answer all of
the questions asked of her and that her answers will remain
confidential.93 In addition, the Guidelines suggest that officers
“take the initiative” in actively evaluating whether the child
understands the process by “watch[ing] for non-verbal clues, such
as a puzzled look, knitted eyebrows, downcast eyes, long pauses,
and irrelevant responses.”94
Moreover, the Guidelines acknowledge that children “may be
less forthcoming than adults . . . in order not to relive their trauma”
and recognize that children “may not present their cases in the
same way as adults.”95 Thus, the asylum officer’s questions should
be “tailored to the child’s age, stage of language development,
background, and level of sophistication.”96 While the burden of
proof remains on the child to prove her asylum eligibility, the
asylum officer must take the child’s “age, relative maturity, ability
to recall events, and psychological make-up . . . into account when
assessing the credibility of a claim and must . . . gather as much
objective evidence as possible to evaluate the claim.”97
The INS Guidelines also stress the key role that children’s
guardians can play in protecting the best interests of the child in
the asylum process.98 Guardians are commonly used in other areas
of U.S. law to assist children. For example, federal law requires
states to provide children who are the subject of abuse or neglect
proceedings with a “guardian ad litem, who may be an attorney or

92

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
94
Id. at 9.
95
INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5.
96
Id. at 10.
97
Id. at 17. Objective evidence may include country reports detailing the
human rights situation or cultural practices in a child’s country of origin, an
evaluation of a child’s medical or psychological condition, as well as other
documentary evidence. See INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 13.
98
Id. at 5.
93
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a court appointed special advocate (or both).”99 These guardians
are responsible for “obtain[ing] firsthand, a clear understanding of
the situation and needs of the child and . . . mak[ing]
recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the
child.”100 The INS Guidelines envision that guardians would assist
in “bridg[ing] the gap between the child’s culture and the U.S.
asylum interview.”101 The INS Guidelines refer to the guardian as
a “trusted adult,” noting that “a child’s parent or relative [may be]
a logical and appropriate support person.”102
Although the INS Guidelines affirm the significance of
children’s guardians in the asylum process, they ultimately place
no affirmative responsibility on the government to provide each
child with a guardian.103 Furthermore, although parents, friends,
and other trusted adults often provide invaluable support to child
applicants, child welfare professionals with expertise in the
particular needs of children asylum seekers could provide a higher
level of assistance.104 The need for a corps of child welfare
professionals is especially relevant for unaccompanied children,
who often lack access to trusted adults.105 Moreover, the INS
99

See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §
5101 (1974) (requiring states to appoint a Guardian ad Litem in every abuse and
neglect proceeding in order to receive federal funding and assistance).
100
Id. at § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix).
101
INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 6.
102
Id.
103
See INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 5, n.12 (“[T]here is no
requirement that a child bring an adult to the interview either to serve as a
support person, attorney, or accredited representative.”).
104
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 52, § 5.7 (encouraging the use of
guardians who have “the necessary expertise in the field of child caring, so as to
ensure that the interests of the child are safeguarded, and that the child’s legal,
social, medical, and psychological needs are appropriately covered” during the
asylum determination process).
105
UNHCR, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care, 1994, at
43 (noting that unaccompanied children lack trusted adults to assist them by
providing factual information to document their claims, supporting them
emotionally, and explaining the asylum determination procedures). See INS
Guidelines, supra note 80, at 17 (acknowledging that “a child who has filed a
separate asylum application . . . [is] frequently without the support of familiar
adults”).
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Guidelines do not guarantee that child asylum seekers will receive
legal counsel.106 Presently, less than half of the children in INS
custody have representation.107
In May 2003, Senator Diane Feinstein introduced bipartisan
legislation in the U.S. Senate that would significantly expand
services for children who arrive unaccompanied in the U.S.108
Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren introduced an identical bill in the
U.S. House of Representatives in October 2003.109 The bill, titled
the “Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003,” would
require children under the age of eighteen in federal custody to be
represented by counsel in immigration proceedings.110 If pro bono
representation is not available to a child, the bill mandates
provision of government-funded legal representation.111 The bill
would also establish a pilot program to develop an independent
corps of guardians ad litem with expertise in child welfare.112
These guardians would serve to “ensure that the [child’s] best
interests . . . are promoted . . . in [immigration] proceedings.”113
Enactment of the bill would represent a major step towards treating
child asylum seekers with the care and sensitivity they deserve.114
106

See INS Guidelines, supra note 80.
See 149 CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (noting that “statistics
demonstrate that applications for asylum are four times more likely to be granted
when represented by counsel”).
108
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th
Cong. (2003) (establishing a Guardian ad litem program, ensuring that
unaccompanied minors have access to legal counsel, and calling upon the
Department of Justice to adopt the INS Guidelines in its handling of children’s
asylum claims before immigration judges and the BIA).
109
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 3361, 108th
Cong. (2003).
110
Id. § 202(a)(1).
111
Id. § 202(a)(3).
112
Id. § 201(a)(3)(E).
113
Id. Supra note 57 (discussing the “best interests of the child” standard).
114
The Treatment of Children in INS Custody: Hearings Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Wendy Young) (noting that the proposed bill addresses many of the “significant
procedural gaps in U.S. policy and practice [that] jeopardize the protection of
[child refugees]”).
107
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The bill would redefine the government’s priorities with respect to
refugee children by making the protection of their interests central
to all actions and proceedings.115
B. Remaining Procedural Obstacles
In 1996, spurred by a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment,
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).116 IIRAIRA placed a one-year
filing deadline on all applicants, even those residing legally in the
United States, to submit their asylum applications for
adjudication.117 The deadline may be overcome by showing that (a)
circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility for
asylum have changed; or, (b) extraordinary circumstances led to
the delay in filing.118 While the one-year deadline may increase the
115

149 CONG. REC. S7026 (May 22, 2003) (“[I]n all proceedings and
actions, the government should have as a high priority protecting the interests of
[unaccompanied] children, most of whom are unable to understand the nature of
the proceedings in which they are involved.”).
116
IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 604. See Conference Report on IIRAIRA
(Sept. 25, 1996), Rep. Rohrabacher, “We are supposed to be watching out for
our own people. When we allocate money for benefits, for service, SSI and
unemployment benefits, it is supposed to benefit our citizens, the people that are
paying taxes, who fought our wars.”
117
IIRAIRA, supra note 47, § 604; Immigration and Nationality Act § 208
(a)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (a)(2)(B) (2003) (requiring an asylum applicant to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that her application has been filed
within one year of the date of her arrival in the United States).
118
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (a)(2)(D) (2003); 8 C.F.R. §
208.4(a)(2) (2004). The regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of the types of
changed circumstances that may qualify as exceptions to the one-year filing rule,
including (a) changes in conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality, (b)
changes in applicable U.S. law, (c) changes in the applicant’s personal
circumstances, such as recent political activism or conversion from one religion
to another, or (d) the ending of an applicant’s dependent relationship to the
principal applicant in a previous application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A), (B),
and (C). The regulations also provide a list of circumstances that could be
considered extraordinary, such as (a) serious illness, (b) legal disability, e.g., the
applicant is an unaccompanied minor or suffered from mental impairment
during the first year after arrival, (c) death or serious illness of a family member
or legal representative, or (d) other circumstances, depending on the facts of the
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efficiency of the system by weeding out applicants who lack bona
fide asylum claims, it raises concerns that genuine refugees who
inadvertently miss the deadline will be barred from gaining
asylum.119 These concerns are particularly relevant for children
seeking asylum who may lack the maturity to understand the
intricacies of U.S. asylum law and frequently do not have access to
legal counsel.120
The INS regulations implementing IIRAIRA partly address
these concerns by providing asylum adjudicators with the
discretion to exempt unaccompanied children from the one-year
deadline.121 According to the regulations, in some cases, children
lacking parental or caregiver accompaniment may suffer from a
legal disability grave enough to invoke the extraordinary
circumstances exception.122 For example, the BIA found that a
fifteen year-old unaccompanied child who was detained in INS
custody during the one-year period immediately following his
arrival in the United States established extraordinary circumstances
that excused his failure to file for asylum before the expiration of
the one-year deadline.123
Accompanied children, however, would not be permitted the

case, including severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within a
refugee community, profound language barriers, or profound difficulties in
cultural acclimatization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i), (ii), and (vi); INS, Asylum
Officer Basic Training Course: One-Year Filing Deadline (March 15, 2001) at
16-17 (on file with author).
119
Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 6.
120
149 CONG. REC. S7020 (May 22, 2003) (“Children . . . have incredible
difficulty understanding the complexities of the immigration system . . . .
[Despite this,] most children in immigration custody are overlooked and
unrepresented.”).
121
8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (a)(5)(ii). The proposed Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act would make this exemption mandatory for all unaccompanied
minors. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th
Cong. § 403(b) (2003).
122
8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii).
123
In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 288 (BIA 2002) (finding that the
detention of an unaccompanied child during the one-year period following his
arrival in the United States constitutes extraordinary circumstances sufficient to
overcome the one-year filing deadline).
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same exemption, under the assumption that these children would
derive their status from a parent’s claim or would be aided by a
parent in making an asylum claim.124 This rationale, while true in
many instances, fails to take into account that some children may
have interests contrary to those of their parents.125 For example, a
child who has suffered severe abuse at the hands of an
accompanying parent would have grounds for asylum while the
accompanying parent would not.126 In a situation where an abusive
parent might wish to protect himself against potential criminal
charges, or may simply wish to remain undetected by the INS, the
accompanying parent may have an interest in preventing the child
from applying for asylum.127 In such a case, the child’s failure to
file before the expiration of the one-year deadline would result in
grave consequences.
The INS regulations should provide asylum adjudicators with
discretion to take into account the factors that prevent any child,
whether accompanied or unaccompanied, from seeking asylum
within the first year of her arrival before barring her claim for
exceeding the deadline. In fact, the INS proposed a similar
approach in its basic training course for asylum officers.128 In
addition to the list of “extraordinary” circumstances sufficient to
overcome the one-year filing deadline in the CFR, the training
course discusses additional circumstances, such as severe family
opposition, language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural
adjustment, which may also constitute extraordinary

124

Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 113 (arguing that no individualized
determination procedure is envisaged with respect to accompanied children due
to the principle of family unity, i.e., the children derive their refugee status from
the head of the family).
125
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 114.
126
Id. at 107. See Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (2001)
(overturning the BIA’s denial of asylum to a young woman from Mexico whose
father subjected her and her family members to extreme physical abuse on
account of her membership in the particular social group consisting of her
immediate family).
127
Women’s Commission Report, supra note 68, at 7.
128
INS, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course: One-Year Filing Deadline
(March 15, 2001), at 16-17.
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circumstances.129 These additional considerations should be
included in the CFR in order to afford immigration judges the
same discretion as asylum officers to protect both accompanied
and unaccompanied children from the harsh consequences of the
one-year deadline.
IV. NEEDED CHANGES IN CHILDREN’S SUBSTANTIVE ELIGIBILITY
FOR ASYLUM
In order to fully realize the INS Guidelines’ admirable goal of
protecting children in the U.S. asylum system, U.S. policymakers
must consider whether children require a separate substantive legal
standard that accounts for their status as children. In addition, U.S.
policymakers must address the fact that U.S. asylum law often fails
to acknowledge the specific forms of persecution unique to child
applicants. Finally, the increasing subjection of children to forced
conscription in armed conflicts around the world demands that
policymakers evaluate whether the exclusion principle, which bars
“persecutors of others” from receiving asylum protection, should
be applied to former child soldiers seeking asylum.
A. Applying a Separate Legal Standard to Children’s Asylum
Claims
Although the INS Guidelines and the proposed bill expand the
procedural protections for children who apply for asylum, they do
not significantly alter a child’s substantive eligibility under U.S.
asylum law.130 Thus, while directing asylum officers to take into
account such factors as “the age, relative maturity, ability to recall
events, and psychological make-up of the child . . . when assessing
the credibility of a claim,” the INS insists that the Guidelines “[do]

129

Id.
Kristine K. Nogosek, It Takes A World To Raise A Child: A Legal and
Public Policy Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact
on Unaccompanied Asylees, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing that the
INS Guidelines do not afford children proper substantive protections under the
Immigration and Nationality Act).
130
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not create new law or alter existing law.”131 A child must still meet
the refugee definition, therefore, in order for these factors to have a
positive bearing on her claim.132 As a consequence, the INS
Guidelines permit asylum officers very little discretion to ensure
that these factors actually have an effect on the ultimate decision to
grant or deny asylum to a child.133
Unlike other types of adjudications, asylum proceedings
present special challenges for applicants.134 In asylum proceedings,
the applicant bears the burden of proof for establishing her
eligibility for asylum.135 In most cases, the events at issue occurred
far away, making it very difficult for applicants to secure the
witnesses, documents, and other evidence crucial to their claims.136
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has proposed that
adjudicators account for these evidentiary challenges by affording
the applicant the “benefit of the doubt.”137 This standard
131

INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 17.
Id.
133
See id. at 18 (“Regardless of how sympathetic the child’s claim may be,
he or she cannot be granted asylum unless the [Immigration and Nationality
Act’s refugee definition] is met. Consequently, the ‘best interests of the child’
principle, while useful to the interview process, does not replace or change the
refugee definition in determining substantive eligibility.”). See Bhabha &
Young, supra note 53, at 97 n.52 (arguing that the Guidelines’ limitation of the
best interests principle to procedural and evidentiary questions, and not the legal
analysis of a child’s claim, is contrary to the CRC’s obligation on states to
“protect and assist”). The UNHCR guidelines, in contrast, require that the best
interests principle guide substantive eligibility determinations, as well as
procedural and evidentiary matters. See supra Part II (discussing the UNHCR
Guidelines).
134
Id.
135
MUSALO, supra note 24, at 869. The applicant bears both the burden of
production of evidence as well as the burden of persuasion of the adjudicator. Id.
136
Id. Governments that engage in persecution often go to great lengths to
cover-up their commission of human rights violations. Id. As a result, it is often
extremely difficult for asylum applicants to gain access to proof of their
persecution. Id.
137
UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, ¶¶ 196, 203-4 (1979). Some
commentators have argued that Canada’s adjudication process incorporates the
132
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recognizes that even after the applicant has made a “genuine
effort” to corroborate her story there may still be a lack of evidence
for some of her statements.138 Moreover, the High Commissioner
recommends that adjudicators play an active role in facilitating the
applicant’s “genuine effort” by sharing the applicant’s duty to
evaluate and ascertain all the relevant evidence.139 Thus, although
the burden of proof in principle remains with the applicant, the
adjudicator also bears a responsibility to “use all the means at his
disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the
application.”140
This approach is especially relevant for child applicants, who
often lack the maturity to understand their role in the adjudicatory
process and for whom it may be more difficult to present evidence
with the same degree of consistency and precision as adults. A
standard that eases the child’s burden of production, applies
evidentiary rules flexibly, and affords the child the benefit of the
doubt with respect to questions of credibility could significantly
increase the likelihood that a child genuinely deserving of refuge
will be granted asylum. Moreover, this standard would bring U.S.
asylum law in closer conformance with international human rights
norms pertaining to children as well as U.S. child welfare laws,
which adopt the best interests principle as the standard that should
be applied in all actions concerning children.141
The policy that child applicants must meet the same
substantive standard as adults cannot be reconciled with the INS
Guidelines’ acknowledgement that, for child asylum seekers, “the
balance between subjective fear and objective circumstances may

UNHCR’s “benefit of the doubt” standard. See Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a
Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants,
23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.REV. 1, 34 (1991) (noting that a favorable decision by
only one member of a two-member panel is required for an applicant to be
granted asylum in Canada).
138
UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 203.
139
UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 196.
140
UNHCR, supra note 137, at ¶ 196.
141
See supra Part II (discussing the best interests of the child standard
under international law).
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be more difficult for an adjudicator to assess.”142 Children under
sixteen years of age may “lack the maturity to form a well-founded
fear of persecution . . . requiring the adjudicator to give more
weight to objective factors.”143 Furthermore, adherence to the adult
standard would not permit adjudicators to afford child claimants a
“liberal application of the benefit of the doubt,” even though the
Guidelines suggest that this may be necessary in certain
circumstances.144 While the informal atmosphere of an asylum
interview may provide sufficient opportunity for an asylum officer
to meet the “challenging responsibility” of adjudicating a child’s
claim, the INS Guidelines do not address the very different context
of removal proceedings, which are far more formal and
adversarial.145
In many areas of U.S. law, including tort, contract, and
142

See supra Part III.A (discussing the rationale behind tailoring the
asylum interview to the child’s age, maturity, background, and level of
sophistication and the need for asylum officers to take these characteristics into
account when adjudicating children’s claims).
143
INS Guidelines, supra note 80, at 19.
144
See id. at 20 (citing the need for asylum officers to afford a child
applicant the benefit of the doubt where it is reasonable to believe the child’s
parents possessed a well-founded fear of persecution prompting them to send the
child outside the country, even though the precise circumstances of the child’s
departure are not known).
145
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 121 (noting that the traditional
courtroom environment was designed to inspire respect for the seriousness of
the process, and, consequently, may intimidate children and prevent them from
participating in the hearing). The removal proceedings are formal and
adversarial particularly because they are conducted before a judge. Id. In some
cases, detained child asylum seekers are brought before the immigration judge
shackled and handcuffed. See Press Release, Amnesty International, First
National Survey of Children in Immigration Detention Exposes Mistreatment,
Lengthy Detentions, Legal Barriers (June 18, 2003), at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/news/2003/usa06182003.html. The Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act of 2003 would require the EOIR to adopt the INS Guidelines in
its handling of children’s asylum claims before immigration judges and the BIA.
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2003, S.1129, 108th Cong. §
401(a) (2003). The bill also mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security
provide “periodic comprehensive training” on the Guidelines to all asylum
officers, immigration judges, members of the BIA, and immigration officials
who have contact with children. Id. § 401(b).
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criminal law, a different legal standard is applied to children based
on their status as a minor.146 The U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged the special status of children under U.S. law,
stating:
Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are
less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly during
the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective and judgment
expected of adults.147
Contract law and tort law afford children greater flexibility to
protect them from the harsh penalties of the adult legal standard.148
Underlying this grant of greater flexibility is the belief that
children, due to their innate vulnerability and immaturity, should
not be assumed to comprehend the impact and nature of their
acts.149 Criminal law provides children with a separate court
system and procedures, with the ultimate goal of rehabilitating
children, not punishing them.150
There is little, if any, evidence that the adoption of a more
146

Kristine K. Nogosek, It Takes A World To Raise A Child: A Legal and
Public Policy Analysis of American Asylum Legal Standards and Their Impact
on Unaccompanied Minor Asylees, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 1 (2000).
147
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (finding that youth
must be considered a relevant mitigating factor in sentencing sixteen year-old to
death).
148
Nogosek, supra note 146, at 14-16 (noting that the modern trend in the
area of contract law is to hold the contract voidable upon the child’s option, and
observing that under tort law, children are either completely immune from
liability, or held to a more flexible legal standard of care that takes into account
the child’s level of intelligence, maturity, and experience).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 16 (noting that juvenile courts were based on the attitude that
children were developmentally incomplete emotionally, morally, and
cognitively, rendering them psychologically vulnerable). See LESLIE J. HARRIS,
CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE
HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 317 (2002) (“The [juvenile] court’s
process was conceived as informal, resembling the method by which parents
deal with children in the home, rather than in terms of counsel, confrontation,
and other characteristics of a criminal trial.”)
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flexible standard for children would result in a dramatic surge in
children’s asylum claims in the United States.151 Even if more
children are granted asylum in the United States under this
standard, the U.S. will have taken seriously its humanitarian
obligations toward the international community by assuming a
larger share of responsibility for children affected by war and
abuse.
B. Recognizing the Forms of Persecution Unique to Children
Neither the INS Guidelines nor the proposed Unaccompanied
Child Protection Act address the forms of persecution unique to
child applicants.152 For many child asylum seekers, the fact that
they are children is central to their claim.153 Examples of cases in
which the persecution alleged only applies to children include
infanticide, female genital mutilation, bonded child labor, child
marriage, and the sale of children.154 In other cases, behavior that
might not rise to the level of persecution when targeted at adults
may constitute persecution when children are the targets.155 For
example, whereas U.S. asylum law currently views military
conscription as a right of sovereign states, and thus not as a form of
persecution, this adult-centered approach is insensitive to the
situations of children fleeing forced military or guerilla
conscription.156 Because children are more likely to be traumatized
151

See Ruppel, supra note 14, at 34 (arguing that, in 1988, the Canadian
government incorporated into its refugee adjudication process the policy of
affording the benefit of the doubt to all asylum applicants). Moreover, in 2002,
Canada incorporated the best interests of the child principle into its Immigration
and Protection Act. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of
Canada, U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.215 (2003). Despite these provisions, individual claims by
children still only account for five percent of all asylum applications lodged in
Canada. Second Periodic Report of Canada, U.N. Committee on the Rights of
the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.6 (2003).
152
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 103.
153
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 101.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See supra text accompanying notes 2-9 (discussing Bernard Lukwago’s
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by hostile situations due to their age, lack of maturity, and
vulnerability, particular behaviors that would not constitute
persecution for an adult, such as aggressive police questioning,
threats, or physical abuse, may produce lasting damage, physical,
or psychological trauma in a child that amounts to persecution.157
Two recent cases involving the forced recruitment of children
by military or guerilla forces reflect the difficulty courts face when
confronted with such forms of persecution that do not fit neatly
into current asylum doctrine. In Cruz-Diaz v. I.N.S., Carlos CruzDiaz, a native of El Salvador who entered the U.S. illegally at the
age of fifteen, sought reversal of the Bureau of Immigration
Appeal’s (BIA) decision to deny him asylum.158 At his removal
hearing, Cruz-Diaz testified that he feared persecution from the El
Salvadorian army, which he believed had murdered members of
his family, as well as guerillas from whom he had deserted.159
Although the immigration judge found that Cruz-Diaz had proven
his subjective fear of persecution, the judge denied his claim
because under current asylum law, the army’s “hunt” for CruzDiaz for fighting with the guerillas did not amount to
persecution.160 On appeal, Cruz-Diaz argued that the immigration
judge erred by holding him to the same standard as an adult who
had evaded military conscription.161 The Fourth Circuit rejected
this argument, finding no Congressional intent to apply a different
standard to children’s asylum claims.162 Thus, it concluded that
Cruz-Diaz was not entitled to special protection from the actions of
the military on account of his youth, and the immigration judge
appropriately treated his claim like that of “any other citizen of El
Salvador who participated in or refused to participate in the
forced conscription and abuse by the LRA). Other situations in which children’s
fundamental human rights are at issue include deprivation of education,
heightened vulnerability following civil upheaval, homelessness, prostitution,
and trafficking. Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 102-03.
157
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 104.
158
Cruz-Diaz v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 1996).
159
Id. at 331.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 331.
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activities of either the guerillas or the army.”163
The Fourth Circuit also denied asylum to Rafael Garcia-Garcia,
who, like Cruz-Diaz, entered the U.S. illegally from El Salvador.164
At his removal hearing, Garcia-Garcia testified that when he was
sixteen years-old, guerillas came to his home and threatened to kill
him unless he joined their forces.165 After the guerillas forced him
at gun-point to attack deserters with a baseball bat, Garcia-Garcia
fled his captors while they were sleeping.166 Upon hearing from his
father that the guerillas had come to his home looking for him, he
fled El Salvador, fearing retaliation.167 Garcia-Garcia argued that
his abduction and the violence he was forced to inflict on deserters
constituted persecution, particularly in light of his age at the
time.168 The Fourth Circuit rejected Garcia-Garcia’s argument,
refusing to find that the forced recruitment of a child amounts to
persecution.169
These cases underscore the limitations of U.S. asylum policy,
which fails to afford children substantive provisions that account
for their status as children.170 As the definition of persecution
continues to evolve, U.S. policymakers must craft asylum policies
that are flexible enough to accommodate the range of situations
from which people seek asylum.171 For example, in 1995, the INS
163

Id. at 332.
Garcia-Garcia v. I.N.S., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4778, at *1 (4th Cir.
Mar. 19, 1999).
165
Id. at *2.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at *4.
169
Id. See also, Perez-Garcia v. I.N.S., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28522 (2nd
Cir.1997) (finding that the Guatemalan military’s beating of a seventeen yearold as a result of his refusal to join the army due to his status as a minor did not
constitute persecution because a general requirement of military conscription is
not persecution regardless of the “highhanded methods” employed by the
Guatemalan military). See infra Part IV (discussing the justifications for
reforming U.S. asylum policy to recognize the forced conscription of children as
a form of persecution).
170
Bhabha & Young, supra note 53, at 103.
171
Id. The UNHCR handbook does not define the term persecution.
Instead, it leaves its meaning open-ended in order to accommodate evolving
164
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issued a memorandum recognizing that the refugee definition
encompasses certain gender-related claims of women asylum
seekers.172 In re Fauziya Kasinga, a case involving female genital
mutilation, became the first BIA precedent decision to grant
asylum to a woman based on gender persecution.173 In reaching its
decision, the BIA carefully considered the context from which the
claimant fled, her position within the society, and the social and
political role of the practice of female genital mutilation within her
culture.174 With growing recognition that gender-based violence
constitutes a human rights violation, asylum policymakers have
reinterpreted the concept of persecution expansively to protect
victims from such abuse.175 Likewise, the concept of persecution
human rights norms. In response to changing social and political conditions in
Africa, the Organization of African Unity extended the scope of the refugee
definition under its 1969 refugee convention to all persons forced to flee across
national borders due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order . . . .” Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, art. 1(2), 1001
U.N.T.S. 45. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by ten Latin
American states in 1984, embraced the OAU’s expanded definition by extending
protection to “persons who have fled their country [because of] generalized
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, [or] massive violations of human
rights . . . .” Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984, ¶ 3, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, at 190-93 (1984-85).
172
Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from
Women (1995) (noting that an applicant’s gender may bear on her claim in
significant ways, for instance, she may have been subjected to a form of
persecution that disproportionately affects women, suffered persecution on
account of her gender, or due to her membership in a particular social group
constituted by women), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/
law/guidelines.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). The memorandum identifies
rape, and other forms of sexual violence, as well as the imposition of harsh rules
on women, as examples of persecution primarily affecting women. Id.
173
21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
174
Pamela Goldberg, Asylum Law: Recent Developments on Gender Issues,
8 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1507, n.7 (Sept. 2003).
175
Considerations For Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from
Women (1995) (citing evolving international human rights standards pertaining
to women as providing the basis for the INS’s new approach to gender-related
asylum claims).
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must be expanded with regard to the forms of abuse child
applicants commonly face in order to allow adjudicators to make
meaningful distinctions between the claims of children and adults.
C. The Exclusion Principle and Children
The exclusion clause under the Refugee Convention, which
bars certain categories of individuals from gaining asylum, does
not distinguish between adults and children.176 In the United
States, the subject of a bar against asylum first surfaced in 1948,
regarding concern that former Nazis and their collaborators could
attempt to use U.S. refugee protections to gain asylum.177 With the
codification of the Refugee Convention’s definition of “refugee”
under the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. refugee law adopted the
Convention’s exclusion from status as a refugee “any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person” on account of their race, nationality,
religion, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
176

See 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 24, at art. 1F.
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention provides as follows:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he
has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make
provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission
to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to
the purposes of the United Nations.
Id.
177

Creppy, supra note 23, at 444. The Displaced Persons Act was a U.S.
immigration initiative created to assist in alleviating the problem of war refugees
by temporarily raising quota limitations. Id. at 445. By deducting the increase in
admitted refugees from future immigration numbers, the DPA facilitated the
admission of over 400,000 displaced persons by 1951. Id. See The Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of June
16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219. The DPA specifically excluded from
the definition of a displaced person, “any . . . person who can be shown . . . to
have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries . . . or . . .
to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forced since the outbreak of the second
world war in their operations against the United Nations.” Id.

BIENMACRO.DOC

836

4/23/2004 1:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

group.178 As military and guerilla leaders increasingly resort to
forced conscription of children on a massive scale, however, the
bright line that supposedly once separated persecutor from victim
has blurred.179
There is both domestic and international consensus that the law
should treat children who have committed criminal acts differently
than adults.180 Like other areas of U.S. refugee law, however, the
exclusion clause does not distinguish children from adults.181 The
situation of forcibly conscripted former child soldiers provides a
stark example of the consequences of applying the exclusion
clause to child applicants.182
178

Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2003).
179
See Machel Report, supra note 54, at para. 34. According to the report,
“Increasingly . . . adults are conscripting children as soldiers deliberately.” Id.
180
See supra Part III.A (discussing how U.S. criminal law treats child
offenders differently than adults); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 2, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force 2002) [hereinafter
ICC Statute] (exempting crimes committed by children under age eighteen from
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction).
181
Michael Kingsley Nyinah, Exclusion Under Article 1F: Some
Reflections on Context, Principles, and Practice, 12 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 295,
308 (2000) (arguing for the need to “narrowly fashion the parameters of [the]
exclusion [principle] so as to take due cognizance of [children’s] special
status”).
182
There are approximately 300,000 children serving as soldiers in current
armed conflicts around the world. See Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers!, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2003) (providing detailed information on the use of child soldiers).
Human rights groups have documented the widespread use of child soldiers in
Angola, Colombia, Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan, and Uganda. Id. Most are
adolescents, although many are younger than ten years of age. Machel Report,
supra note 54, at § 35. Many are abducted from their families and forced to
follow orders upon threat of death. Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers!, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2003). Armed with AK-47s and M-16s, children are often positioned on the
front lines of combat. Id. Some are forced to serve as human mine detectors or
human shields. Id. Military and rebel forces often recruit young girls to serve as
sex slaves. Machel Report, supra note 54, at § 45. In the civil war that ravaged
Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s, rebel forces abducted thousands of children,
some as young as five or six years-old, who witnessed and were forced to
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Military and rebel recruiters prey upon children precisely
because of their physical and psychological vulnerability.183 Child
soldiers are more obedient, less likely to question orders, and
easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.184 Furthermore, unlike
their adult counterparts, children remain vulnerable even after
hostilities have ceased.185 Many rebels refuse to release child
soldiers to their families after the hostilities are over, while those
who are released or escape often have no living family members to
whom they can return.186 Some child soldiers fear retaliation by
their former communities or former enemies for their perceived
ties to the rebel forces.187 Former child soldiers, denied an
commit atrocities against civilians, including amputations, rape, and murder.
Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). In
order to overcome their fear and resistance to fight, rebels forced children to
ingest pure gunpowder, cocaine, and other drugs. Id. See also CNN Presents:
Return to Freetown (CNN television broadcast, 2002). The filmmaker, Sourios
Samura, interviewed Tamba and Sasko ten years after rebel forces abducted
them from their families at ages eight and fifteen, respectively. Id. Tamba and
Sasko described witnessing and participating in brutalities against innocent
women and children. Id. While walking along a deserted battlefield, Tamba
stopped at the place where he had participated in burning civilians alive. Id.
When the filmmaker asked Tamba how he could have done such a horrendous
act, the following exchange took place:
TAMBA: [The rebels] gave us gunpowder and we ate it. They put some
medicine in it and that gave us the mind to be able to kill.
FILMMAKER: Didn’t you feel bad?
TAMBA: No, because at the time the gunpowder was working on me.
FILMMAKER: Today you are here, you know that you burned some
bodies here and you came back here today. Tell me, what does it look
like Tamba?
TAMBA: May God forgive me.
Id.
183

Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at http://www.
hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
184
Machel Report, supra note 54, § 34.
185
Id. § 49.
186
Id. § 52.
187
Id.

BIENMACRO.DOC

838

4/23/2004 1:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

education and the opportunity to learn civilian trades, are in
tremendous need of assistance in gaining the skills necessary to
reintegrate into peacetime society.188
In response to the recruitment of children in conflicts
throughout the 1990s, human rights activists, child advocates, and
international humanitarian organizations embarked on a massive
campaign to combat the use of child soldiers under the age of
eighteen.189 Their advocacy culminated in the U.N. General
Assembly’s unanimous adoption of the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict.190 Since its adoption in May 2000,
more than one hundred nations have signed, and seventy nations
have formally ratified the Protocol.191 On December 23, 2002, the
United States became the forty-fifth country to ratify the

188

Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). See
also Machel Report, supra note 54, para. 56 (stressing the importance of
education in preparing former child soldiers to find employment, facilitating
their acceptance at home, and providing them with a sense of meaning and
identity).
189
See Human Rights Watch, The Child Soldiers Protocol, available at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/protocol.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). In
1998, six non-governmental organizations formed the Coalition to Stop the Use
of Child Soldiers. Human Rights Watch, Governments Urged to Stop the Use of
Child Soldiers, available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/june/chil0701.htm (last
visited Apr. 13, 2004). Existing international standards allowed for the legal
recruitment of children as young as fifteen, while defining a child as any person
below the age of eighteen. Id. Among other goals, the Coalition sought to
correct this inconsistency. Id.
190
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu2/6/protocolchild.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Child
Soldiers Protocol].
191
See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers website, at
http://www.child-soldiers.org (providing updated information on the status of
ratifications and signatures) (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). According to the
Protocol, a country need only have signed the CRC to sign and ratify the
Protocol. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 9.
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Protocol.192 The Child Soldiers Protocol establishes eighteen as the
minimum age for forced recruitment and direct participation in
hostilities.193 While the Protocol does not speak directly to a state’s
obligations vis-à-vis refugees who are former child soldiers, it calls
upon states to implement programs aimed at the “physical and
psychosocial rehabilitation and social reintegration of children who
are the victims of armed conflict.”194
In Liberia and Sierra Leone, where children were abducted and
forcibly conscripted on a massive scale, the UNHCR looked to the
CRC and the Child Soldiers Protocol rather than to exclusion
practice in developing its policies toward former child soldiers.195
These policies recognize that forced conscription represents a
serious violation of children’s rights, and that children, due to their
age, should not be held responsible as adult combatants.196 For
example, whereas adult former combatants may not seek asylum
until they have been demobilized and placed under observation for
a period of time in an internment camp, former child soldiers are
not interned, live with other refugees in a refugee camp, and may
apply for asylum.197 The U.N.’s Machel study also emphasized that
the use of child soldiers is a problem created by adults, which
should be eradicated by adults.198 In addition, the treaty
192

Human Rights Watch, Stop the Use of Child Soldiers!, at
http://hrw.org/campaigns/crp/protocol.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
193
Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 1. In addition to
prohibiting states from recruiting children under the age of eighteen into their
armed forces, states are also required to take “all feasible measures” to prevent
nongovernmental armed groups, such as guerilla and rebel forces, from
recruiting children. Id. art. 4(2). See Michael Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 94 A.J.I.L. 789, 793 (2000)
(discussing the obligation on states parties to the Protocol to take “all feasible
measures” to prevent the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen,
including by the enactment of legislation to ensure that such recruitment is
punishable as a criminal offense under their national law).
194
Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 190, at art. 6(3).
195
Press Release, UNHCR, Liberia’s Child Soldiers Relive Lost Childhood
in Sierra Leone (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with author).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Machel Report, supra note 54, at §§ 25 and 30.
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establishing the International Criminal Court makes the
recruitment of children under age fifteen a war crime.199
Recognizing that child soldiers are victims first and foremost, the
ICC statute shields children under the age of eighteen from
prosecution.200
While there are important policy reasons for prohibiting
individuals who voluntarily commit serious crimes from enjoying
the benefits of asylum, these policies, which serve to prohibit
former Nazis and other perpetrators of serious crimes from seeking
refuge in this country, were not intended, nor should they be
extended, to exclude children.201 To apply the bar to former child
soldiers like Bernard Lukwago would fly in the face of the positive
work that U.S. policymakers and the international community have
undertaken to address this pernicious form of child abuse.
CONCLUSION
The growing international consensus that child asylum seekers
require special protections has important implications for U.S.
asylum laws. Although the U.S. asylum system currently does not
differentiate between adult and child applicants, the United States
should build on recent proposals to afford greater procedural
protections to child asylum seekers with substantive provisions that
address the forms of persecution unique to children. With millions
of children suffering from the consequences of armed conflicts
around the world, the international community has a special legal
and moral obligation to ensure that child asylum seekers receive
adequate care and protection. As this record of violence makes
clear, a world unwilling to protect children is one in which
“children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed . . . exploited as
soldiers . . . starved and exposed to extreme brutality.”202 In short,
it is a world devoid of the most basic of human values. The United
States has an important role to play in ensuring that children who
199
200
201
202

See ICC Statute, supra note 180.
Id. art. 26.
Nyinah, supra note 181, at 308.
Machel Report, supra note 54, at § 3.
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